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Abstract

Title of the dissertation: The Flag State Performance as a crucial element of the Human
Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) on marine casualty investigations

Degree:

Master of Science in Maritime affairs

This dissertation investigates the connection of marine accidents causation with the Flag State
Performance based on the analysis of the accident onboard the vessel CARNIVAL SPLENDOR.

An in-depth look on the international regulatory framework regarding the marine accident
investigations as set-up by the IMO and UNCLOS, explains the importance of the accident
investigations for the maritime safety and for the prevention of future disasters at sea.

The accident analysis with the application of AcciMap and HFACS-MA illustrated many causal
factors on every involved level but the most important result was the identification of the
connection between the Flag State and the Recognized Organization to the accident. It was the
initial intention of this study to look for contributing causal factors beyond the company’s
management level at the top of the hierarchy.

Among the many flaws, the results of the accident analysis revealed oversight gaps at the Flag
State, which are causal factors of significant importance for the accident and generally for the
maritime safety. The analysis of the Flag State obligations deriving from the fundamental maritime
conventions indicated the importance for adoption of concrete policies at governmental level
regarding the oversight of the Recognized Organizations.

The concluding chapters explains how the incorporation of the Flag State Performance into the
5th layer of HFACS will contribute to the better understanding of the causational factors of marine
accidents, as deriving from the governmental level. Furthermore, it is indicated that by connecting
the related causal factors at the top level with the Flag State Performance, will assist Flag States
and Administrations to evaluate their adopted maritime policies and cover potential gaps.
Keywords: Accident Investigation, AcciMap, CARNIVAL SPLENDOR, Flag State Performance,
HFACS.
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1.

Introduction

This chapter aims to introduce the background of marine accident investigations,
the dissertation’s objectives and the methodology to be used. Additionally, the
difficulties and limitations that have been encountered for the creation of this thesis
are also mentioned.

1.1

Background

At the occurrence of any marine accident, many kinds of investigations are
performed from the different stakeholders of concern. Investigations can be judicial,
administrative or internal investigation inquiries by the shipping company. Each
investigation is carried out for a purpose, this thesis will deal with the models used on
the incident investigations for discovering the underlying causes that have contributed
to accidents, located at the top layers of the organizational structure as well as to
identify policy and legislation gaps at governmental level.
Although accidents are inextricably linked to human factors, the approach to
investigate and identify these factors relies on a range of parameters to be considered
such as the working environment, the background, training and expertise of each
individual (Ergai et al., 2016). A model that well addresses those factors is the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS; Wiegman & Shappell, 2003).
HFACS is a human error taxonomy based on Reason’s well-known ‘‘Swiss Cheese”
model of accident causation (Reason, 1990). HFACS is a well-established
methodology in several domains including aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003),
mining (Patterson & Shappell, 2010), maritime (Chen et al., 2013), rail (Reinach &
Viale, 2006), and medicine (Eibardissi et al., 2007). Another well-known model is the
SHEL model (Hawkins, 1987), which is named after the letters: Software (S),
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Hardware (H), Environment (E) and Liveware (L). Both models aimed to identify
underlying factors that could cause an accident.
Weather conditions, the traffic type, operational problems and regulatory gaps
are some of the factors that can result into marine accidents (Schröder-Hinrichs et.
al., 2020). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has acknowledged that
human errors are one of the main causal contributors to accidents (IMO, 1999). Both
Swiss Cheese and SHEL models have been adopted by IMO to propose guidelines
for the investigation of human factors in marine casualties and incidents (IMO, 1999,
2008). This means, that the incident investigators should a) take into account the
actions of the sharp-end personnel at the time of the occurrence, b) seek for an
explanation for the conditions which shape the actions of sharp-end personnel and c)
identify latent organizational factors that allowed the unsafe conditions to exist.
The Flag State (FS) has a variety of roles, but is of utmost importance the
protection of lives, property and the rights of the state’s citizens. The tragedy of the
RMS TITANIC shocked the public due the high number of lost lives in the North
Atlantic and remedial actions were needed to avoid recurrence. The investigation of
an accident aims to provide a remedy with the identification of the accident’s root
causes and create the frame for the development of safety measures to be applied in
the future. Since these matters are of public interest, the FS is responsible to conduct
the accident investigations. In the contemporary era of shipping, the statutory work of
the Maritime Administration (MA) is assigned to a Recognized Organization (RO) and
the Classifications Societies delegating on behalf of the MA as RO. The FS has to
oversight the ROs but the accident investigation is an obligation that remains to the
FS due to the fact that the root causes could be at the top of the organization so the
investigation body is important to be governmental.
Environmental protection is a major priority for a Coastal State (CS) and
maritime accidents in most cases are affecting the marine environment, especially
when the cargo is oil or another noxious substance. When dealing with maritime
safety, the aim is to prevent accidents from happening and create a safety culture that
reflects the readiness to the unexpected. The TITANIC disaster in 1912 triggered the
creation of the international convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Other
serious maritime accidents, for example the Torrey Canyon, were catalysts for the
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adoption of the other international maritime conventions. The purpose of SOLAS as
well as the many other international conventions like LOADLINE, STCW and the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) is to
set safety standards for the ship construction and operation in order to minimize the
possibility of an accident that will lead to a casualty and environmental disaster. What
is learned from the accident investigations is vital for the shipping industry and leads
to the continuous update of those conventions combined with the enhancement of the
safety culture.
The sovereignty rights that every State has, allow them to set the necessary
regulatory framework that will facilitate the accident investigation on the ships flying
its flag as well as to cases affecting the territorial sea of the state. Since shipping is
truly an international activity, cooperation between nations is essential for the
protection of the marine environment and the conduct of accident investigations. The
IMO has a vital role for the shipping industry as an international specialized agency
of the United Nations (UN) which promotes the enforcement of international
conventions for the protection of the environment, maritime safety and accident
investigation. The major international maritime conventions set the obligation for the
FS to perform accident investigations and the IMO has issued a significant amount of
instruments among the years to support it. The International Labour Organization
(ILO) which is also a UN specialized agency has great interest in the accident
investigations but is focusing on the labour protection aspects.

1.2

Problem Statement

Even though the marine accident investigations aim to identify the root causes
of accidents, the organizational factors are of major importance for an accident
especially when deriving from the actions of the MA. The Flag State Performance
(FSP) is an indication on how well the FS manages to implement its obligations. The
incorporation of the FS performance element in the HFACS taxonomy will assist in
the deeper understanding of the contributing causal factors laying at the governmental
level. The further development of the taxonomy will be used as a tool to identify gaps
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that have been neglected by Flag States and improve their control over their ROs.
Additionally, the improvement of the FS performance will result in reduction of
incidents occurring onboard ships.

1.3

Research Aim and Objectives

The FS is the regulating authority of its maritime industry and holds the full
responsibility of the actions taken by the delegating authorities. The marine accident
investigation is an obligation that has to be performed by the FS. The performance of
the flag is closely related to the number and type of accidents occurring in the fleet.
The objectives of the present thesis are to:
●

Contribute to the further development of the maritime HFACS taxonomy and
add the element of FS performance.

●

Determine the significance of the adopted policies and quality management
that a FS applies on its maritime industry.
The contribution to the 5th layer in the HFACS taxonomy will result in a deeper

understanding of maritime accidents and prevent future casualties at sea. This thesis
aims to identify causal factors with the analysis of the accident onboard the vessel
CARNIVAL SPLENDOR, which are deriving from the actions of the FS and relate
them with the FSP. The objective of the research is to identify if the incorporation of
the FSP as an additional category in HFACS, can provide a better understanding for
the identified gaps of the FS’s overseeing capacity and if the adopted policies are
adequate to ensure the implementation of the IMO instruments.

1.4

Research Questions

According to Wiegmann and Shappell (2003), HFACS is structured within four
levels: a) The unsafe acts, b) preconditions occurring for unsafe acts, c) lack of
supervision and d) organizational influences. Each level of this taxonomy is linked to

4

the previous one (Ergai et al., 2016), leading to the organizational factors that could
contribute to the marine casualties. Although the HFACS is considered a great tool to
explain and understand accidents, maritime disasters keep occurring and there is a
need to go further up in the hierarchy of the taxonomy and identify potential gaps. By
analyzing causal factors located at the governmental level and interpret them as low
FSP, the taxonomy will assess the following research hypotheses:

●

The implementation of IMO requirements combined with well-established
policies by the FS ensures a good FSP.

●

A FS that implements proper oversight over the organizations delegating on
its behalf will result in high safety standards for the fleet and reduced
probabilities of serious accidents.

●

The further development of the HFACS taxonomy by incorporating the FSP
element will provide an additional layer of safety in the maritime industry.

1.5

Methodology

As first step for the investigation of marine casualties is required to have a tool
that analyzes and distinguishes the errors. A qualitative method is used in the present
thesis in order to determine the contributing causal factors, related to the accident
onboard the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR and connect them with FSP. For the present
study, the official investigation report from the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is
the main source for document analysis. Figure 1 provides the graphical overview of
the accident analysis for CARNIVAL SPLENDOR.
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Figure 1. Analysis of the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR accident.

As a primary tool of analysis, AcciMap will be used to identify the causal
factors contributed to the accident of the passenger cruise ship CARNIVAL
SPLENDOR which resulted in complete loss of power. Jens Rasmussen in 1997
developed the AcciMap which was part of the risk management strategies procedures
for sociotechnical systems (Rasmussen, 1997). The development of AcciMap was
meant to a tool for analyzing events and decision-making processes which have
contributed to the loss of control (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). A great advantage
of AcciMap is that after the accident analysis, recommendations regarding safety can
be extracted and for this purpose it was used by many accident analysts (Hopkins,
2000). The relevant AcciMap procedures followed for the accident analysis of the
CARNIVAL SPLENDOR are listed in Table 1 below.
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Table 1. AcciMap analysis procedure
Step No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Step Description
Determine the sections / levels of the ACCIMAP analysis
Identify the outcome(s) for analysis based on accident data
Identify all the causal factors
Identify the appropriate ACCIMAP level for each cause
Categories causes and labeling them
Create the causal lines among the identified causes
Fill in the gaps in the causal chain (if necessary)
Check the causal logic
Formulate safety recommendations

The identified causal factors with the use of AcciMap will be compared with
the results of the HFACS taxonomy respectively. The importance of AcciMap for this
study is that the relevant policy and legislation gaps at the governmental level can be
relatively easily identified and could contribute to the further development of the 5th
layer in the HFACS. Figure 2 provides a general overview of the causal factors in an
HFACS taxonomy with a 5th layer as external factors. The approach is based on the
HFACS-MA developed by Chen et al. (2013). The methods that were adopted and
used in the HFACS-MA were selected so the model would be fully compliant with the
IMO’s guidelines for the investigation of marine casualties (IMO, 1999). Furthermore,
with the HFACS-MA approach, accident investigators have a well-developed model
to conduct maritime casualty investigations.

Figure 2. Causal factors in HFACS
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Part of the HFACS-MA is the construction of a Why-Because Graph (WBG)
as suggested by Chen et al. (2013). For a WBG, the creation of an inventory table is
needed and will include all the identified causal factors that contributed to the
accident. WBG provides a simple linear way to demonstrate the findings identified
from the accident analysis. The accident analysis with the HFACS-MA approach is
illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. HFACS Analysis Process

The process begins with the review of the USCG accident investigation report
for the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR followed by identification of the causal factors based
on the evaluation of the available data. The relevant findings are summarized in the
inventory table that will be used for the WBG. In the end, discussion will be made on
the extracted findings from the HFACS.
For the present thesis valuable material was collected by the library of WMU
and from other available internet sources and databases. Additionally, the author’s
experience and various private sources contributed to this work.
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1.6

Research Limitation

Due to limitations in length of this thesis as well as other limitations, it is
extremely difficult and vast to analyze in full depth each contributing causal factor and
find all possible connections to the actions and decisions of the MA and FS. This
research is focused on the fundamental causal factors of the studied accident related
to the organizational influences at the top of the hierarchy. Furthermore, to evaluate
each and every adopted policy of Panama state regarding maritime regulatory
framework is beyond the limits of this dissertation but it is suggested for future
research to provide a more holistic approach regarding the FSP and the accident
investigation.

1.7

Overview of the Research

This study is structured in three parts with the associated chapters. The first
part covers the general background about the accident investigations as described in
the introduction. The second part provides an in-depth review of the existing
regulatory framework for the accident investigations in chapter two. A literature review
of the accident investigation theories and models, relevant to this thesis is presented
in chapter three. The results of the analysis, the relevant findings, discussion and
conclusions are presented in the final part of the thesis.
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2.

International

Regulatory

Framework

of

Marine

Accident

Investigations

In this chapter, the relevant international regulatory framework of maritime
accident investigations is presented. The approach is done through the analysis of
member states obligations based on the fundamental maritime conventions of IMO,
ILO and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Additionally, other applicable instruments and codes that have been adopted by the
IMO are also analyzed.

2.1

International Law

2.1.1

UNCLOS
The UNCLOS is considered as the “mother convention” that sets out the

fundamental legal principles and terms of international rights and obligations for the
member states. The operational and technical provisions existing at the maritime
conventions and instruments of the IMO, derive from the legal provisions of UNCLOS.
In other words, the relations among nations, regarding maritime issues is determined
by the UNCLOS “in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation” (1982). Many
maritime disasters from the Torrey Canyon to the more recent of the X-Press Pearl
have caused significant environmental damage. The protection of the marine
environment is one of the elemental principles to come across on various international
maritime conventions as well as in UNCLOS. Considering the aim of the accident
investigations which is to enhance safety and minimize accidents at sea, it can be
considered that accident investigation is promoted by UNCLOS.
It is duty for every FS to perform an accident investigation on the ships flying
its flag, when those ships are involved in incidents that cause damage to the marine
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environment, loss of life or any other serious injury. Investigation is also performed for
incidents when the vessel caused material loss or damage. It is important to be noted
that if the incident has occurred in the territorial sea or internal waters of another state
which has jurisdiction over the territory, then both states have to agree on how to
proceed for the investigation and cooperate. Those obligations are declared in
UNCLOS Article 94. Paragraph 1 of the article expresses the obligation for the FS
“exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters
over ships flying its flag” while paragraph 7 describes the obligation of the FS to
“cause an inquiry … every marine casualty or incident” (UNCLOS, 1982).
Jurisdictional matters may cause disputes, concerning the interests between
the different states. UNCLOS clearly defines jurisdictional aspects on numerous
articles of the convention. Since UNCLOS deals with the high seas, incident
investigation for cases occurred in the territorial waters of a state are not regulated by
the provisions of the convention but from the national legislation of the country and
from other international maritime conventions that will be analyzed further below. The
sovereignty rights of the state over its territorial waters allow the CS to initiate an
inquiry for any incident that took place in its territorial waters. This is one of the
fundamental rights of UNCLOS as described in Article 2, but this right does not stand
in vacuum since Article 18 the “meaning of passage” and Article 19 “meaning of
innocent passage” complete the regulatory framework for the jurisdictional matters. In
other, the CS has no jurisdiction on ships flying a flag of another state unless the
incident involving the vessel flying a foreign flag, causes threats to the interests of the
CS. The concept of jurisdiction is supplemented by the Article 27 & 28 of UNCLOS
for the criminal and civil jurisdiction in relation to foreign ships respectively. Based on
the above, the same is applied for the accident investigations.

2.1.2

IMO
The IMO from its creation has adopted numerous conventions, but SOLAS,

MARPOL and International Convention on Load Lines (LL) are considered as the
pylons for the existing maritime regulatory framework. Based on the provisions of the
above-mentioned conventions the MAs are obliged to conduct accident investigation
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on their ships. The relevant obligations of those conventions are analyzed further
below.

2.1.3

SOLAS
As per chapter I part C, Regulation 21 of SOLAS every MA has the obligation

to perform casualty investigation to the ships flying its flag, if it judges that this
investigation can contribute to the improvement of the convention. Moreover, each
contracting government that undertakes an investigation has to provide the relevant
findings to the organization. Causes that led to an accident in the majority of the
cases, are connected with the provisions of SOLAS; therefore, the investigation
findings are important to assess the effectiveness of the regulations and if needed to
adopt new or change the existing ones.

2.1.4

MARPOL
The regulatory framework of MARPOL in regard to accident investigation

indicates similar provisions as the SOLAS which are found in Article 12 of the
convention. The major difference here is on the type of the accident and the
investigation is subjected to cases in which the marine environment had been
affected. The obligation for the member states of the convention to supply the IMO
with the findings from the conducted investigations, also applies here for the same
reasons. Additionally, MARPOL requires from the states to report at the IMO and to
any other state which may be affected from incidents involving harmful substances.

2.1.5

Load Line Convention
Similarly to SOLAS and MARPOL, the LL in Regulation 23 (as revised by 1988

protocol) describes the relevant obligations for conducting investigations “of any
casualty occurring to ships for which it is responsible and which are subject to the
provisions of the present Convention” (IMO, 2005). The obligation for the contracting
governments to provide the organization with findings from their investigations, has
the same scope as in the other mentioned conventions.

12

Based on the above, different international maritime conventions provide
similar obligations for the member states regarding the casualty investigations on
ships. Every adopted convention and code is supplementing others in a way to cover
all the relevant aspects of safety and environmental protection. Marine investigations
have significant importance for the IMO since in the way of learning from the incidents,
the maritime conventions are revised and new regulations or codes are emerging in
the shipping world.

2.1.6

Casualty Investigation Code
With the aim to promote safety at sea and to have uniformity on the procedures

for the accident investigations, IMO from the beginning of its creation has adopted
numerous resolutions regarding this issue. According to the provisions of SOLAS
Regulation I/21, the MARPOL’s Article 8 and 12, the LL’s Article 23 and UNCLOS
Article 94 there was a need for a unified code that will provide the necessary
framework for the causality investigations. Thus, IMO adopted the Code for the
Investigation of Marine Casualties. The human factor is interlinked with the causes of
marine accidents, for that reason the IMO in 1997 adopted the A.849(20) resolution
which provided the guidelines for the investigation of human factors. The importance
to understand these factors through the accident investigation has been highlighted
and new theories for investigations to detect the underlying causes of accidents have
been applied. The MSC.255(84) revoked previous instruments and IMO adopted the
new Code of the International Standards and Recommended practices for a Safety
Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code),
in 2008. In order to make the code mandatory, the organization amended SOLAS the
same year and added the Chapter XI-1 with the provisions of special measures to
enhance safety and the relevant obligations are included in Regulation 6.
The Casualty Investigation Code (CIC) aims to provide a unified approach for
the conduct of investigations made by the member states and to promote the notion
of cooperation among them. The primary scope of the CIC is to prevent potential
future marine casualties. Another code’s objective is to identify the contributing causal
factors of marine accidents. Additionally, the cooperation among states for the
casualty investigations is highlighted into the CIC (IMO, 2008). The code urges the
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need for cooperation between the substantially interested states. This means that in
the casualty investigation, apart from the state that has full jurisdiction other states
can participate having interest due to the loss.

2.2

IMO Instruments

2.2.1

Resolution

A.1075(28):

Guidelines

to

Assist

Investigators

in

the

Implementation of the Casualty Investigation Code (IMO, 2013a)
The international maritime conventions provide the general obligations for the
member states but specific guidelines have to be established to achieve a unified
approach on the maritime casualty investigations. The IMO with resolution A.1075(28)
is providing the required framework for the conduct of the investigations and is aiming
to assist the MAs and the flag investigators to perform their task. Considering the main
purpose of the casualty investigations, the guidelines provided in the resolution
A.1075(28) are focused on “identifying safety deficiencies through a systematic safety
investigation of marine casualties and incidents” and with the extracted findings to
cover gaps at the existing regulations (IMO, 2013a). According to the provisions of
this resolution, it is suggested that the safety investigations can be split up to five main
areas which are: human, environment, equipment, processes and procedures,
organization and external influences. With the identification of causation factors of
marine accidents from these five areas is expected to increase the awareness and to
enhance the adoption of proactive measures to reduce accidents, save lives and
protect the environment. The most important element in this instrument is that it
addresses the need to identify organizational and external influences from the
accident investigations which are factors having significant contribution to the
accident causation and are difficult to be recognized. The purpose of the casualty
investigation is not to allocate liability or blame the responsible, but to prevent similar
incidents in the future.
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2.2.2

Resolution A.1070(28): IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code)

(IMO, 2013b)
The international maritime conventions are providing a robust regulatory
framework for the shipping world. These conventions are setting the rights for the
member states, but rights come with obligations and the states have to fulfil and
respect them. The IMO in 2013 adopted the IMO Instruments Implementation Code
(III) as a way to enhance maritime safety and to protect environment by developing a
strategy that will ensure the fulfilment of those responsibilities and obligations from
the FS, CS and Port State (PS) (IMO, 2008a). III it is directly referred to the FS
investigations and it is related to them since the scope of this code is to “monitor and
access” (IMO, 2008a) the effective implementation and enforcement of the relevant
IMO instruments. Accident investigation is one of the obligations the FS has and by
reviewing the strategies that the state has adopted; an audit can reveal gaps that
need to be rectified. Important aspect of the III is that it addresses the review of the
set strategy not only of the FS but of the CS and PS which are not clearly highlighted
in the other conventions.
The III has specific provisions on how the delegation of authority have to be
transferred to the ROs as well as how the FS will maintain the proper oversight on
them. The work of the ROs and FS surveyors is of crucial importance for maritime
safety. Lacks in performing their tasks and failing to meet their obligations can result
in fatalities onboard ships and is vital for the FS to have a well-established oversight
strategy to identify in advance potential faults. A non-well-structured oversight and
monitoring system from the FS, can be connected to the accidents the Flag’s fleet
has.

2.2.3

The Human Element in Marine Accidents
The regulatory framework initially established by IMO set its focus on the

constructional and shipbuilding standards and to the mandatory safety equipment
required onboard so ships can operate safely. Just after 2000 the human element
started to be considered as important factor and IMO shifted its focus to that (O’Neil,
2003). Apart from the amendments of STCW convention and the adoption of the ISM
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code, the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) was a fundamental convention verifying
human element recognition.
Even though the MLC is not a purely IMO convention, it was developed with
the combined efforts of the IMO and the International Labour Organization (ILO) in a
way to recognize the significance of the human element in shipping. MLC 2006
entered into force in 2013 and consolidated the majority of maritime instruments that
have been adopted prior to the convention. The MLC covers aspects affecting all the
involved parties in shipping, owners, FSs, PSs and seafarers.
Human factors are widely considered as the main cause for the occurrence of
maritime accidents (Hetherington et al., 2006) which emerges from the perception
that when humans are in a non-ideal situation, they will make errors (Chauvin, 2011).
For that reason, establishing the required decent working constitutions for seafarers
is a measure to prevent accidents, achieve a safer shipping industry and protect the
environment (ILO, 2006).

2.3

Reporting to the IMO

The relevant requirements for the reporting of the casualty investigations to
the IMO are included in each convention. The reporting is an obligation of the MA
which has to be in accordance with IMO criteria. IMO in order to ensure the
implementation of these obligations by the member states has included in the scope
of the III Code the analysis of investigation reports made by MA. This procedure firstly
aims to facilitate the reporting process of the MA and have a comprehensive
knowledge-based mechanism for the identification of trends and rule making process
(IMO, 2013b). Moreover, IMO developed a common database to facilitate this work,
the Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS). The most important factor
is that every investigation report is available to those who may have interest and
contribute to the safety of life at sea.
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2.4

Summary

Although the available regulatory framework of the IMO regarding the accident
investigations not only establishes the requirements but provides the necessary tools
for the member states to perform their work. The IMO has outlined the importance of
the accident investigations as a tool that will promote safety onboard ships, from its
early beginning. The fast technological improvement combined with the development
of new psychosocial science theories aiming to the deeper understanding of human
factors in the complex sociotechnical systems, made the shipping world to shift its
focus on the human element. Since the human element is significantly affected by the
organizational influences it is important to find those connections through the accident
investigation. For that reason, shipping has adopted strategies, policies and
regulations to establish a safer working environment.
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3.

Accident Analysis

This chapter aims to present the accident analysis models and the reasons
why it has been decided to use AcciMap and HFACS for the analysis of the accident
onboard the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR. The scope is to present the basic theories of
the available models and examine their potentials for the use in the accident analysis.

3.1

Marine Accident

In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the subject the meaning
of accident has to be determined. According to Leveson, an accident is described as
“An undesired or unplanned event that results in a loss, including loss of human life
or human injury, property damage, environmental pollution, mission loss” (Leveson,
2016, p.181). In parallel, the definition adopted by the IMO illustrates the abovementioned events in more detail adjusted accordingly to fit better into maritime
accidents (IMO, 2008).

3.2

Accident Analysis Theories

It is common perception for the shipping industry that for 80% of the accidents
the contributing factor is human error and is quoted quite a lot as an example.
Common approach is observed in other transportation industries; for example, in
aviation it is acknowledged that human error have attributed for the 70-80% of the
accidents (O’Hare et al., 2007; Lower et al., 2018). The proportion is significantly high
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and for that reason it is necessary to investigate what is lying below the widely
acknowledged human error.
For the analysis of accidents, using the appropriate model and method is the
key element to allow the investigator to discover the underlying factors that have
contributed to the accident, especially those located at the top of hierarchy. Our
modern society is characterized by complex sociotechnical systems, in the same way
accidents are complex and each one has its own unicity. The use of a single model
that will fit for all is not a viable option (Reason et al., 2006). Depending on the
accident analysis, some models will fit better than others. Complex accidents require
comparable models to be used for the analysis while there are cases where a simple
model can be used and provide plenty of useful recommendations to avoid
recurrence. Each model is designed to identify certain causes; for instance, the Swiss
Cheese Model (SCM) is appropriate for finding the latent conditions waiting to be
activated. In contrast the Root Cause Analysis is focused on active failures and
definitive causes. Man Technology Organization is accurate for finding cause factors
that have contributed to an accident. System Theoretic Accident Model and Process
is looking for parts of the system that have violated the safety barriers. Cognitive
Reliability and Error Assessment Method is good for recognizing a group of actions
that will explain the accident. AcciMap through the analysis of events and decisionmaking processes will demonstrate the loss of control which resulted in the accident.
HFACS scope is to identify the human error at each level of the taxonomy and defined
at the SCM (Hollangel & Speziali, 2008). Obviously, each and every model follows a
different path but the decision of the right method relies on the desired result and is
of utmost significance.

3.3

The Human Element Consideration

Back in the 1960 the consideration of the risk assessment begun to be part of
the planning process while accident analysis theories became subject of research. It
has been realized that a treatment needed, since the size of the accidents increased
and the consequences did also, while the public would not tolerate a repetition of a
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disaster. Those methods established in that era are still applicable for many industries
today but evolved among the years due to the technological advance and complexity
of the systems. The nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island just before 80s was
catalytic for the identification of the human factor and its interaction with safety
systems. Furthermore, the Chernobyl disaster triggered a chain reaction for the
development of the safety culture, which was beyond the technological systems and
incorporated the human element to cover the organizational factors (Hollangel &
Speziali, 2008). The developed models acknowledged human error as the cause of
accidents. This approach has been heavily criticized over the years since many
researchers describe human error as a symptom and not the cause of accidents.
There are different ways to look at a problem and each can generate different
perspectives. For instance, the acceptance of the human error as a symptom will
make an investigation to look for relations between the human element, the
organizational structure and technology (Woods et al., 2017, p.19).
The general view regarding human error has changed over the years moving
from the old to the new (Hollangel & Speziali, 2008). According to the old view, the
human element is accused as the main cause of the accident. Moreover, it is based
on the perception that the work can be carried out safely only in the absence of unsafe
acts and it is believed that any complex system can operate safely if there are no
human errors in place. On the contrary, the human error is considered as a symptom
of a deeper trouble in the system, according to the new view and takes for granted
that humans make mistakes. The proposed remedy for that is to perform adjustments
to the system in order to avoid errors. With the new view the center of attention is on
the reasons why accidents occurs and on how to establish measures to avoid
recurrence. Comparing the two views, the old one would always result in human error,
as the cause of the accident (Dekker, 2014). On the other hand, by investigating an
accident with the new view, the human error will be part of the investigation and not
the only cause of the accident.
Shipping has been characterized as a tightly coupled system with tendencies
defined by various factors (Perrow, 1999; Hollangel & Speziali, 2008). Figure 4
illustrates the position of the shipping industry relative to coupling level (Loose - Tight)
in parallel with various accident analysis models. For tightly coupled systems it is
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difficult to find a way of absolute control, since the results of an event will affect the
other parts of the system relatively fast. According to earlier studies (Perrow, 1999;
Hollangel & Speziali, 2008), the same is applied to complex systems while restricting
the options for conducting operations with safety, since the only purpose is to achieve
the determined results.

Figure 4. The Loose - Tight coupling diagram and relevant accident analysis models
(Hollangel & Speziali, 2008).

3.4

Accident Analysis Models

According to the provisions of the CIC (IMO, 2008) HFACS is the appropriate
tool to identify human factors for maritime accidents. HFACS has been widely
accepted by many researchers in studies regarding safety and have been used in
parallel with other available methods like the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), blended
together and creating new models (Zhang et al., 2019; Sarialioglu et al., 2020). The
Shipping industry has adopted HFACS and applied in many of its sectors such as the
machinery spaces (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011), cruise and passenger ships and
many others (Celik & Cebi, 2009; Chauvin et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013; Akyuz &
Celik, 2014; Theophilus et al., 2017; Ugurlu et al., 2018; Yildirim et al., 2019; Qiao et
al., 2020). Even though HFACS has been vastly applied in aviation (Shappell &
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Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell 2003). The adoption of HFACS for accident
analysis in different industries and various domains proves that it is a reliable method.
AcciMap on the other hand differs from the common FTA models since it does not
follow the linear approach but has a more systemic approach (Rasmussen, 1997).
AcciMap was developed by Rasmussen in 1997 as part of the proactive risk
management strategies following a system-based analysis for the accident with a
graphical representation of the failures leading to the accident (Rasmussen, 1997;
Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). The graphical representation allows the investigator
to analyze how causal factors, decisions and errors intersect in the accident’s flow of
events, with the actions of the sharp end personnel, influenced by the organizational
or governmental factors located at the top. The ability of AcciMap to identify
contributing factors in the company’s management level, the regulatory bodies and
government level, make it ideal for the investigation of marine casualties in order to
discover legislation and policy gaps at the top level.

3.4.1

ACCIMAP
AcciMap is the accident analysis method based on the concept which

considers that the contributing factors of an accident can be found on many levels
representing the involved domains of an industry. AcciMap requires the building of a
tree shaped diagram with the events and conditions that interacted and resulted into
the accident. The top levels engulf governmental, regulatory and organizational
factors while the lower levels have factors immediately related to the accident. Every
casual factor is connected to its effects and in that way it illustrates how that factor
affects other factors which have also contributed at the critical event. AcciMap
incorporates the events and conditions in a graphical delineation that combined
generate an organizational accident.
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Since shipping is considered as a complex socio-technical system the
AcciMap diagram is divided into six different levels described below. Starting from the
top to the bottom:

1. Government policy and legislation
2. Regulatory bodies and associations
3. Company management
4. Technical and operational management involved
5. Accident flow of events and acts
6. Configuration of scenery and equipment

Depending on the industry and type of accident, each level can be modified
accordingly to fit the analysis. The parts involved in the decision-making process are
depicted in the levels 1 to 4, while level 5 include the flow events to the accident and
level 6 demonstrates the environmental and equipment configurations. The main
scope of AcciMap is to identify the relations of the causal factors between each level,
allowing the investigator to have a vertical analysis for the connection of causal factors
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). At the accident flow of events, the critical event in
the end, represents the “loss of control of accumulated energy” (Rasmussen &
Svedung, 2000) as it is demonstrated in a cause consequent chart which is the base
for predictive risk analysis. The buildup of a causal tree demonstrates the connection
between critical event and consequent events as the flow is influenced by factors
located in the upper levels and human errors (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). Figure
5 shows the involvement of various decision-making levels in the controlling of a
hazardous process, in a complex sociotechnical system.
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Figure 5. The Involved levels of decision making in risk management (Rasmussen, 1997,
p.11)

AcciMap can be identified as a simplistic model since with the use of a single
diagram containing causal factors and their connections, the reader can have the full
picture of a complex system and its errors. Furthermore, the identification of gaps in
the decision-making levels from their connection to the accident, assists legislation
and policy makers to reconsider their strategies and adopt new standards. Although
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AcciMap has a lot of potentials for accident analysis and investigations, has also
limitations, which are summarized below.

AcciMap strengths:
●

Based on the risk management theory, simple to use and understand.

●

The causal diagram requires the consideration of all contributing factors on
each level of the system as well as to identify the connections between them.

●

The identification of errors on each level of the system provides a holistic view
of the accident.

●

Through the exhaustive analysis of the accident, the investigator have a clear
accident etiology.

●

AcciMap is focused on the system improvement (extracting safety
recommendations) and not to blame the human element for errors.

AcciMap Limitations:
●

The determination of the causal factors is based on the investigators’
perception without a standardized method.

●

The results can be relatively vague for the same reason mentioned above.
Based on the analyst’s focus, separately conducted AcciMaps on the same
accident can illustrate different causal factors.

●

The organizational system model lacks criteria for the determination of its
adequacy.

●

AcciMap’s approach method for in-depth analysis of the physical factors and
the system’s parts is limited.

●

After the completion of AcciMap a causal analysis in text format is required to
provide explanations on the extracted results.
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3.4.2

Swiss Cheese Model - SMC
It has been suggested by many safety analysts the use of a unified model that

will incorporate the different human error models. The most well-established accident
causation model came from James Reason in 1990 (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
The first use of SCM was for the aviation industry. Soon enough SCM was adopted
in other industries proving its vast application ability for accident analysis.
Notwithstanding SMC’s wide acceptance, researchers have criticized the model’s
causation along with the fact that disregards the complex interactions of the system
in the incident. (Dekker, 2014; Leveson, 2016, p 17; Erik, 2017). According to
Hollnagel and Speziali (2008), the risk management and analysis of human complex
systems set the ground for the development of the SMC.

Figure 6. The basic components of a productive system (Reason, 1990, p.200)
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Figure 6 demonstrates the fundamental components of any system and the
resulting product is the scope of the organization; for example, in our case
(CARNIVAL SPLENDOR) the transportation of passengers at sea. These parts are
responsible for the decision-making process, determining the required targets that
have to be achieved based on the feedback coming from outside of the system. For
shipping, the Line Management is the shore-based company responsible for the fleet.
Preconditions are the necessary elements in the system for achieving the desired
results. A good Line Management must ensure that the required Preconditions are
established. Preconditions does not only include the material availability but also the
procedures required for the human element, like the training, guidance, crew’s
wellbeing, etc. The interaction of human and machinery generated the actual outcome
of the system which is part of the Productive Activities. Every system is required to
have barriers to prevent errors in the system, these are the Defenses which are found
in any part of the system (Reason, 1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Despite the fact that barriers are in place, marine accidents still occur and will
continue to occur (Ugurlu et al., 2013). Figure 7 provides a graphical representation
of the SCM with the active and latent failures leading to the accident. Each hole
represents the absence of barriers in the system and the alignment of all those is
required for an accident to occur. According to Reason (1990) failures fall into two
categories, the Latent and Active failures. Latent failures are contributing factors to
the accident, resulted from conditions that were in the system undetected for a period
of time. The Active failures are attributed to the sharp end in the system with
immediate effect. That is the key difference between latent and active failures since
the former will be activated after the alignment with other factors in the system and
during an investigation may not detected. Accident is the failure of a system to prevent
the alignment of active and Latent conditions by the absence of barriers allowing the
hazard to cross every hole (gap) of the system (Hollangel & Speziali, 2008).
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Figure 7. Reason’s (1990) SMC with active and latent failures. (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2003, p.47)

3.4.3

HFACS
The HFACS model for the accident analysis categorizes each hole of the SCM

(Wiegmann & Shappell 2003) resulting in a taxonomy of failures, divided in four levels.
From the bottom to the top these four levels are: 1) Unsafe Acts, 2) Preconditions for
unsafe acts, 3) Unsafe supervision and 4) Organizational influences. Since the
system can have inputs beyond the organizational level the need for an additional
level was needed and named 5) External factors. According to Reinach and Viale
(2006) the new model firstly used in the railway industry while later on adopted by
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various other transportation and non-sectors (Celik & Cebi, 2009; Patterson &
Shappel, 2010; Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2013). As a hybrid model
for accident analysis HFACS combines the SCM with the systemic approach and
human factors analyzing the causal factors with the incorporation of latent and active
failures (Ugurlu et al., 2020). As the provisions of CIC adopted in 2008, Chen et al.,
(2013) developed HFACS - Maritime Accidents as a modified version of the original
HFACS in a way to align the provision of the code with a more suitable model for
shipping. Reason’s Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) is integrated in the first
level of the new HFACS hybrid model as a mean to define error from violation.
Furthermore, Hawkins’ SHEL model (Hawkins, 1987) incorporated in the second level
of preconditions for unsafe acts, so the HFACS-MA model be fully compliant with the
IMO’s CIC provisions (Chen et al., 2013). The fifth level at the top of the taxonomy
developed to include the governmental, policy and legislation gaps (Reinach & Viale,
2006).

3.5

Summary

To sum up the relevant accident analysis theories described in this chapter
provide the necessary framework for accident investigations. Their reliability has been
proven by the wide application on many domains of transportation and other
industrialized sectors. The identification of human error at the sharp end level is
prerequisite but the recent history showed that the investigations have to go beyond
that and look for the organizational and governmental influences. The ability of the
AcciMap model to identify causal factors beyond the administrational level is of great
importance for this study since it can reveal factors that might be neglected from other
models. Since the subject of this thesis is the maritime accidents the CIC’s provisions
are extensively considered and the use of HFACS verifies that is in line with IMO’s
recommendations. For the incident of CARNIVAL SPLENDOR, AcciMap and HFACS
will be used and the extracted findings will be compared.
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4.

Research Results

This chapter is presenting the findings from the analysis of the CARNIVAL
SPLENDOR incident. Firstly, the description of the incident with all the relevant
information of vassel is provided followed by the general findings. The extracted
results of the AcciMap and HFACS analysis are provided in detail respectively. The
basic source for this case is from the investigation report of the USCG (USCG, 2013).

4.1

General details of the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR

The CARNIVAL SPLENDOR is a passenger cruise ship owned by the Carnival
corporation and was built at the Italian shipyard of Fincantieri in Genoa. For
construction phase Registro Italiano Navale (RINA) was the classification society
performing the oversight and transferred to the Lloyd’s Register (LR) upon the delivery
in 2008.
The power plant installed is composed of six identical Wartsila 46 diesel
engines configured into 2 Engine Rooms (E/R) that powers two propulsion motors.
The vessel’s particulars and the installed machinery specifications provided in
Appendix 1 and 2 respectively.
The Panama Maritime Authority (PMA) was the responsible agency for
conducting a maritime safety investigation as the FS of the vessel. USCG was also a
substantially interested state having the responsibility to investigate this marine
casualty. Both agencies after agreement decided that the USCG will be the leading
marine safety investigation state. PMA upon the review of the investigation report
have agreed with the conclusions and recommendations of the report.
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4.2

The incident onboard CARNIVAL SPLENDOR

On November 8, 2010, the vessel suffered a mechanical failure in No5 Diesel
Generator (DG) resulted in the ejection of lube oil and fuel from the engine casing that
eventually ignited (pool fire). The vessel was underway with 3299 passengers
onboard and crew of 1167. The DG No5 was at the aft E/R and the pool fire ignited
the cables running overhead the DG and resulted in the generation of significant
smoke that restricted the ability of the crew to locate and extinguish the fire. The HiFog system activated with 15 minutes delay and by that time the fire at the cable runs
was beyond the range of the system. The fire in combination with the excessive heat,
caused extensive damage to the cables of the aft E/R and led to a complete loss of
power. It took two hours to locate the fire in the cables above DG No5 by the
Emergency Response Teams (ERT), while the attempts to extinguish it did not have
satisfactory results. The excessive heat and the absence of cooling in the E/R allowed
the fire at the cable runs to continue burning. After five hours of firefighting efforts, it
was decided to activate the fixed CO2 system for the aft E/R. Two attempts were made
to activate the system, the first from the remote location activation point and then
manually from the CO2 room. None attempt was successful, the system was
inoperative with the only release of CO2 to be made inside the CO2 room due to leaks
from numerous fittings and hose connections. Seven hours after the ignition, the fire
in the cable runs was extinguished due to the absence of oxygen in the room, resulting
from the closure of the watertight doors and dumpers during the attempt to use the
CO2 system. Afterwards, the engineers of the vessel made several attempts to restart
the unaffected DGs with no results since the damage to the cables in the E/R was
extensive. The only available source of power the vessel had, was by the Emergency
DG and the back-up battery system. At the day of the incident the vessel was located
off the coast of Mexico and due to lack of propulsion it was towed to the port of San
Diego in California which arrived on 11 of November. Likely there were no injuries or
fatalities to the crew or the passengers. It is important to mention that on November
7, 2010 a day before the accident, the USCG conducted the annual control verification
exam onboard the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR, no outstanding deficiencies found
regarding the material condition of the vessel (USCG, 2013). A full-detailed timeline
of the accident is available in Appendix 3.
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4.3

General Findings

Soon before the start of the fire in the aft E/R the DG No5 experienced a
torsional vibration alarm followed by a fail start alarm the next minute. The E/R was
manned by three engineers who were on duty. In response to the alarm the Second
Engineer on watch ordered the Second Engineer and the Cadet to investigate the D/G
No5 failure, while the two latter immediately reported hearing an explosion and seeing
black smoke at the Deck C of the E/R. In a short time, the E/R filled with smoke and
flames observed near DG No5. Engineers on watch informed the Chief Engineer
about the situation, initiated the emergency procedures for E/R fire and evacuated the
space. The Hi-Fog system for local protection was not manually activated by the
engineers before their evacuation. The follow up is a sequence of events consisting
of wrong decisions in the sharp end as well as underlying causal factors on every
level of the organizational structure.

The Engine Failure. The incident investigation revealed that the mechanical
failure and explosion at the DG No5 occurred due to many contributing factors such
as the design of components and the engineers’ failure to identify the real cause of
alarms that occurred prior to the incident. A hydrolock event was the main cause for
the bend of the connecting rod in the DG No5 that went undetected causing a fatigue
fracture to the components of the engine. The poor design of the air cooler system
led to the deterioration of the system that contributed to the hydrolock event.
Furthermore, the Carnival and Wartsila were fully aware about the issues of their
cooler system and it was a common problem for the “Dream Class” vessels built at
Fincantieri shipyard. Despite the fact that Carnival took steps to prevent and manage
the air cooler issues onboard the vessel in July 2010, those steps were short term
fixes requiring human interventions. The investigation showed that the necessary
procedures to solve the problem were not routinely followed. The evidences show
causal factors regarding the design of the system, the qualification capacity of the
operators and at supervision from the company in regard to the following of the
procedures. On top of that, Carnival decided to prolong the slow turn interval time of
the DGs from 30 minutes to two hours despite the recommendation of Wartsila, that
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such action will increase the risk of not detecting a hydraulic lock at the DG. The
decision was made as a cutting cost measure to reduce the space required for air
bottles (starting system of the engine). The removal of a safety barrier necessary for
preventing hydrolock was a causal factor of great significance and catastrophic result.

The Fire and the Hi-Fog Suppression System. The Hi-Fog system is acting
as the first line of response, providing local protection of the covered area. The initial
fire was the result of the fatigue fracture of DG No5 components and the ejection of
fuel and oil from the engine casing. It was a pool fire that did not last very long and
probably burned out on its own. The 15-minute delay for the activation of the Hi-Fog
was a result of the combination of three factors. Firstly, the onboard installed Hi-Fog
system was programmed with a 40-second time delay in the automatic activation
sequence for the system. Secondly the engineers never activated the system
manually, while they had initiated all the other emergency procedures for the E/R.
Thirdly, the Bridge OOW performed a general reset on the fire detection system twice.
The result of his action was the return of every smoke and fire detector to a normal
status. Afterwards, the fire detectors above DGs No5 & No6 were in fault status since
the flames destroyed them and the automatic activation was not available anymore
for the area of DGs No5 & No6. If the system had been manually activated or the
Bridge OOW never interacted with it, the loop fire would have been extinguished and
most probably would not had ignited a second fire above the DG at the cable runs
which was beyond the range of the Hi-Fog nozzle. It is obvious that the crew lacked
situational awareness regarding the emergency procedures. Furthermore, the 40second activation delay parameter, evidence that the system lacked effective barriers
to ensure its uninterrupted operation and readiness.

The Firefighting Efforts. The firefighting efforts of the crew to extinguish the
fire in the cable runs above DGs were ineffective for a variety of reasons including the
non-implementation of the company’s SMS procedures. The quick response team’s
lack of familiarity with E/R layout coupled with the use of inadequate extinguishing
means resulted in time loss and allowed the fire to further spread. The temporary
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control of the fire combined with the lack of cooling at the cable conductors increased
the heat which allowed the burning of the cables’ insulation. The ineffective
maintenance of smoke boundaries resulted in the spread of smoke to nearby areas
of the E/R activating the fire and smoke detectors as well as the Hi-Fog system in
unaffected spaces, making difficult to identify the exact location of the fire. Finally, the
decision made by the Captain to ventilate the E/R before the fully extinguish of the
fire and without the flow of water on the scene of fire allowed the fire to reflash. The
above evidence shows that the crew lacked familiarity with the company procedures,
the vessel’s spaces and firefighting techniques. The factor of inadequate training was
verified by the post casualty evidence regarding the performed drills onboard and the
quality of the company’s drill program. The duration of several drills was less than 30
minutes while the crew had not performed any fire drill in the E/R for the last six
months. Furthermore, the Captain and the bridge team did not appear to take part in
the performed drills. The absence of a system for the verification and qualification of
the drilled program by the company was a catalytic contributing factor to the spread
of the fire and the crew’s incapacity to extinguish it. Additionally, during the annual
control verification exam, the Port State Control Officers (PSCO) did not identify the
actual crew competence regarding the emergency preparedness, indicating
enforcement gaps into the system.

The Fixed CO2 System. The installed CO2 system was inoperative and
ineffective to extinguish the fire. The evidence showed the system was affected by
incorrect installations of equipment dated back to the building of the vessel. On the
first annual service of the vessel’s CO2 system in 2009 the technicians discovered
numerous issues in the system’s equipment. A backward installed non-return valve
and a plug obstructing the main discharge line were some of the many. Despite the
company’s actions to rectify the deficiencies on the vessel and ensure that “Destiny
Class” sister vessels inspected for similar issues, the CO2 system had more
undetected problems. Another causal factor of the system’s failure was the
operational procedures for the release of the CO2 approved by RINA (the
classification society for the building phase). The instructions described the
operational procedure in a reverse order, and were in contrast with the provisions of

34

the 2006 resolution MSC.206(81) and the amendments of the Code for Fire Safety
Systems, regarding the CO2 systems using ball valves. Post casualty evidence
revealed issues that should have been identified at the initial or the subsequent
inspections of the vessel by the shipyard, the company, the FS and the RO. These
causal factors reveal organizational influences, regulatory and policy gaps,
enforcement gaps and company’s negligence deriving from the top of the
organizational hierarchy.

4.4

The AcciMap Analysis Results

Based on the methodology described in chapter 3.4.1 this section will provide
an in-depth analysis for the case of the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR, divided into the six
levels which include the different involved actors. An overview of the AcciMap analysis
is illustrated in Figure 8. The identified contributing factors have grouped into frames
of the same color coding respectively to each level.
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Figure 8. The AcciMap diagram for the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR
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Accident Flow of Events and Acts. The accident onboard the CARNIVAL
SPLENDOR is outlined from a series of events at the level five with chronological
order, starting from the left towards the critical event at the right end. After the
explosion at the DG No5 in the aft E/R (analysis regarding the equipment is provided
at level 6), oil and fuel ignited creating a small pool fire between DGs No5 & No6. The
automatic fire detection system was activated at 06:00 (local time) and the engineers
on duty as well as the bridge OOW were aware of the situation. The area where the
DGs were located was covered by the Hi-Fog system, acting as a first line of defense
against fire but the system activated 15 minutes after the ignition of the fire, for the
area of DG No5 & No6. Furthermore, the Hi-Fog system first started drenching water
in areas of the E/R that were unaffected by the fire. The delay in activation of the HiFog system resulted in the start of a second fire at the cable runs above DG No5,
producing a significant amount of smoke while the initial fire most probably selfextinguished after consuming all the flammable materials (Fuel and lube oil). It took
two hours for the ERT to locate and extinguish the fire at the cable runs, with the use
of CO2 and dry powder extinguishers which were not considered as most suitable
means for the size of the fire. As a consequence, the fire reflashed and the extensive
heat allowed the cable insulation and jacket material to continue to burn. All the
attempts to control and extinguish the in the E/R made by the crew were insufficient
and the fire self-extinguished due to the lack of oxygen when the watertight doors and
dumpers were sealed for hours during the attempt to use the fixed CO2 system. The
damage to the cabling system of the E/R was irreparable resulting in the total loss of
power for the vessel which was towed to the port of San Diego.

Configuration of Scenery and Equipment. This paragraph indicates the
factors related to the equipment and is explained in parallel with the accident flow of
events. The initial fire was the result of the explosion of the DG No5. According to the
analysis the excessive accumulation of water in the air cooler of the engine was a
known issue and the cause for the hydrolock in the engine (hydrolock is the event
when water which is uncompressed, enters the combustion chamber of an engine
reducing the travel distance of the piston and possibly damaging engine components).
The severely corroded air cooled allowed the accumulation of rust at the drain valve
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not allowing the release of the excess water and giving the impression to the operators
that it was empty. Despite the preventive measures the system has, a hydrolock event
occurred in the past and created a fatigue fracture at the connecting rod resulting in
torsional vibration and the explosion of the DG. The other factor of the scenery is the
ventilation of the E/R space before the fire was fully extinguished. The order came
from the Captain as a way to “clean” the E/R from the smoke which allowed the fire
to reflash and lead to the decision for the use of the fixed CO2 system which was
totally inoperable.

Technical and Operational Management Involved. The first revealed factor
is the design flaw regarding the piping system for the air coolers and the cause for the
fatigue fracture at the components of the DG. Additionally, the engineers in the past
wrongly identified what caused the “Slow turn mechanical failure alarm” revealing
aspects regarding the qualification and capacity to perform their duties and the
oversight they had from Carnival. The delay in the activation of the Hi-Fog system
was a major contributing factor for the further development of the fire. Both operators'
actions (engineers did not activate the system prior to evacuation and the reset of the
fire alarm panel by Bridge OOW) show that they lacked proper training and
qualification regarding the response in emergencies. The issue of the training and
preparedness of the crew is supplemented from the prolonged time to detect the fire,
the lack of familiarity with the E/R layout and the use of inadequate means to
extinguish the fire at the cable runs. The response of the crew does not stand in
vacuum since the investigation showed that the procedures regarding the drills were
not followed at all. The decision to ventilate the E/R while the fire was not in control
reflects the crew’s reduced capacity for contingencies and the unawareness of
relevant firefighting strategies and procedures.

Company Management. In this level, the identified contributing factors
revealed underlying causes related decision making that affected equipment and
errors at the sharp end. The air cooler issue was known since 2009 and was common
for the whole Dream class fleet, despite that Carnival did not take the appropriate
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measures to rectify the problem. Furthermore, the decision to increase the duration
of the slow turn interval for the start of the DGs while knowing that this action may not
prevent a hydrolock event shows that the management was focused on budgeting
and lacked of a proactive approach that would have prevented the initial problem with
the DG. The 40-second-delay parameter at the activation of the Hi-Fog system is
another sign of poor hazard assessment and lack of preventing barriers. The instant
activation of the Hi-Fog system would have extinguished the first fire and prevented
the development of the second one at the cables, also the system would not have
been affected by the human decisions at the sharp end. The crew’s preparedness for
emergencies reveals flaws in the design of the drills and training program established
by the company, lack of supervision and gaps regarding the procedures for
contingencies. The company in the past had developed a policy named “Standard
Operating Procedures for Shipboard Firefighting” (SOPF) as additional guidance, but
it was not integrated in the SMS of the company. Additionally, the absence of evidence
that the procedures described in the SOPF had been followed during the drills, verifies
the fact of poor supervision and quality of the training program. The fact that the
company did not incorporate the SOPF procedures in the SMS was a reason to create
confusion at the sharp end; Størkersen et al., (2017) have revealed many examples
where issued documents form the company, the management decisions and the SMS
are self-contradictory. Finally, the reasons why the CO2 system was inoperative are
leading to the company’s lack of procedures regarding the inspection standards for
the equipment. During the first annual service inspection of the system, the
technicians revealed numerous deficiencies related to the equipment. Despite the
actions of the company, deficiencies still remained undetected together with the CO2
activation instructions which were in wrong order and identified at the post casualty
investigation.

Regulatory Bodies and Associations. A day before the accident, the USCG
had conducted an annual control verification exam onboard the vessel. According to
the inspection, the vessel was fully compliant with the ISM requirements and the
PSCO did not identify any shortcomings at the crew’s capacity to deal with
emergencies. However, the post casualty investigation showed the opposite and
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revealed gaps in the guidance on how to evaluate the fire drills conducted by the crew.
The reduced capacity to recognize the actual preparedness of the crew for
emergencies was a factor that contributed to the development of the incident.
Administrational oversights factors are of major importance engaging the actions of
the RO to the accident. At the delivery of the vessel the inspection conducted by the
RO failed to detect the deficiencies related to the CO2 system or the issue with the
activating instructions which was in contrast with the Code for Fire Safety Systems.
The use of the CO2 in the E/R would have been the last line of defense but the RO’s
neglect to detect the issues and removed a significant safety barrier from the system
resulting in adverse consequences.

Government Policy and Legislation. At the top of the hierarchy, it has been
identified gaps regarding the oversight of the RO by the FS. The neglects made by
the RO had a significant impact at the flow of events and deriving from the poorly
implemented oversight from the FS.

4.4.1

Summary of AcciMap
The analysis of the identified causal factors with the AcciMap for the incident

onboard the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR revealed errors in the sharp end, flaws in the
design of equipment, lack of procedures and a profit-oriented managing company with
limited concerns regarding safety and supervision. However, the factors with most
significant importance were in level one and two. The gaps at the FS’s
administrational level connected to the RO’s actions, which contributed to the
development of the accident. The connection of the FS and the RO derive from the
obligation the FS has, to properly oversee the action of the RO acting on its behalf.
Gaps in the established policy by the FS to control the organizations acting on its
behalf, combined with a low level of the governmental will to deal with aspects of
maritime safety can contribute to the development of marine casualties. The FSP is
an indicator of how well the MA manages to fulfil its obligations and is related to
oversight of the ROs.
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4.5

The HFACS-MA Analysis Results

In this section the indent onboard the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR is presented
based on the HFACS as described in chapter 3.4.3. In Table 2, the identified causal
factors are listed and coded respectively. With the use of HFACS-MA it was possible
to identify 27 contributing factors related to the accident. There were numerous
preconditions and organizational factors that contributed indirectly in the development
of the accident that were lying below the actions of the sharp end.
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Table 2. Inventory of HFACS causal factors for CARNIVAL SPLENDOR
Category
TE
EV1
EV2

Description
Complete loss of power for the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR
Bend of the connecting rod and fatigue fracture of the DG components
Torsional vibration of DG No5

EV3
EV4
EV5
EV6
EV7
EV8
EV9
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
P1
P2

Failure of DG No5 and explosion
Fire in the aft E/R
Activation of the Hi-Fog system with 15 minutes delay
Ignition and fire of the cable runs above DG No5
Fire reflashed
CO2 System activation failure
Extensive damage to the cables at the aft E/R
Engineers fail to identify the real cause of the “slow turn mechanical failure alarm”
Engineers did not manually activate the Hi-Fog system prior the evacuation of the E/R
The bridge OOW performed a general reset of the fire detection system twice
Use of inadequate extinguishing means to control the fire on the cables
E/R ventilated while the fire was not fully extinguished - Firefighting
Poor maintenance of smoke boundaries - smoke spread to adjacent areas
Delay of the ERT to locate and extinguish the fire
Poorly designed piping system for the air coolers and drainage
Excessive accumulation of water within the receiver and charger of the air cooler of
DG No5
Severely corroded and leaking air cooler
Hydrolock
Lack of crew familiarity with the E/R Layout and fire-fighting strategies
Poor quality of the fire drills performed by the crew
40-seconds delay for the automatic activation of the Hi-Fog system
CO2 activation instructions in wrong order
CO2 system leaks
Short-term fixes - Carnival, Wartsila and Fincantieri were aware about the problems
with the air coolers since 2009
Inadequate means to monitor the crew's preparedness for emergencies and its
documentation
Carnival failed to identify the malfunctions of the CO 2 system on the delivery of the
vessel and at the first annual inspection
Over-voluminous SMS procedures / SOPF manual instructions were not included in
the SMS
Carnival increases the Slow-Turn interval from 30 minutes to 2 hours
Quality and assessment of Company’s drills and training program
Inadequate inspection standards and procedures regarding the equipment by the
company
FS, Negligence in performing its duties / Panama did not perform the appropriate
oversight to the RO
RO, Negligence in performing its duties / Fail to identify deficiencies at the installation
of the CO2 system
RO, Negligence in performing its duties / Approved instructions for the activation of
the CO2 system, which were described in wrong order
PSC, Insufficient guidance for evaluation / The PSC officers did not identify the crew’s
actual proficiency regarding the preparedness for contingencies during the inspection

P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
S1
S2
S3
O1
O2
O3
O4
E1
E2
E3
E4
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The Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) have been identified in
accordance with HFACS-MA and are listed into their respective categories at Table
3.

Table 3. The demographics of the HOFs associated with the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR
accident using HFACS-MA
HFACS-MA Category
External Factors
Legislation Gaps
Administration Oversights
Design Flaws
Organizational Influences
Resource Management
Organizational Climate
Organizational Process
Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision
Planned
Inappropriate
Operation
Failure to correct Known
Problem
Supervisory Violations
Preconditions (SHEL)
Condition of Operator(s)
Software
Hardware
Physical Environment
Technological Environment
Liveware

Inventory
E4
E1, E2, E3
-

N (%)
4 (14,8%)
1 (3,7%)
3 (11,1%)
0 (0%)

O2
O3
O1, O4

4 (14,8%)
1 (3,7%)
1 (3,7%)
2 (7,4%)

S2, S3
-

3 (11,1%)
2 (7,4%)
0 (0%)

S1

1 (3,7%)

-

0 (0%)

P5
P1, P7, P8
P2, P3, P4, P9
P6

9 (33,3%)
1 (3,7%)
3 (11,1%)
4 (14,8%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (3,7%)

Unsafe Acts
7 (25,9%)
Skill-Based errors
A2, A7
2 (7,4%)
Rule-Based mistakes
A1, A4
2 (7,4%)
Knowledge-Based mistakes
A3, A5, A6
3 (11,1%)
Routine Violations
0 (0%)
Exceptional Violations
0 (0%)
Note: The percentage numbers relate to all 27 identified causal factors.

HOFs have been identified on every level of the taxonomy, but not in every
category. The unsafe acts (25.9%) coupled with the preconditions (33.3%) account
for the majority of the contributing factors (59.2%) as active failures. Based on the
results of the HFACS-MA it is obvious that the human element is the main contributing
factor to the accident but the combined percentage of the contributing factors from
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levels one to three (40.7%) shows the significant influence these factors had to the
accident. In Figure 9, a WBG illustrates the 27 identified contributing factors with their
causal connection.

Figure 9. WBG for the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR

As it is obvious from the graph the nodes O2 (Increase of the slow turn interval
for DGs) and O4 (inadequate inspection standards and procedures for the equipment)
had significant influence on the underlying factors that directly or even indirectly
triggered the line of events with DG failure and explosion.
The lack of familiarity of the crew regarding the E/R layout and firefighting
procedures P5 was influenced by many factors starting with the O1 (SMS did not
include the SOPF manual) connected to S2 (inadequate supervision from the
company). The node of E4 (Evaluation capacity of USCG PSCO) to S2 is made since
the scope of the inspection is to detect deficiencies to ensure safety onboard ships;
the result of the inspection had indirectly affected the final event. The S2 was also
influenced by O3 (the quality of the drills and training program) reflecting the safety
culture of the company. Furthermore, the importance of the O1, O3 and S2 latent
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failures is evidenced from the connection of P5 with five active failures A2, A3, A4, A5
and A6.
The E3 node goes straight to the P8 (CO2 activation instructions in wrong
order) which is coupled with P9 and connected to EV8 the activation failure of the
CO2, the last line of defense against fire in the E/R. The EV6 is highly possible to have
contributed to the top event significantly but the EV8 was the last barrier to prevent
the further development. Additionally, the nodes E1 (FS oversight) to E2 (RO
negligence) leading to P9 (CO2 system Leaks) supplemented by O4 and S3 at the
company’s management level.
At the precondition level the P7 (40-second-delay for the automatic activation
of the Hi-Fog system) node lacks connections with nodes on the higher levels. Despite
the USCG recommendation to Carnival for removing this parameter from the fire
detection system, the decision remains at the company’s management. The time
delay for the activation varies widely among the different manufactures and shipping
companies. The regulatory bodies have to consider and assess the risks deriving from
the existence of such parameters for the activation of the Hi-Fog systems.

4.5.1

Summary of HFACS-MA
The analysis of the accident with the use of HFACS-MA identified

organizational influences and lack of supervision as the causal factors of the limited
capacity of the crew to deal with emergencies (P5); furthermore, the same two factors
are related to design flaws of the machinery equipment (P1). The most important
connection is between the FS (E1) and the actions of the RO (E2) regarding the issues
of the fixed CO2 system. This connection reveals gaps for the oversight of the RO by
the FS that have to be seriously considered and investigated further.
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5.

Discussion

In this chapter, the main research results are reviewed and discussed further
in order to identify the answers to the research questions. Furthermore, the integration
of the FS performance into the 5th layer of the HFACS as a possible contributing factor
will also be discussed.
The results extracted from the AcciMap analysis revealed design flaws and
interesting findings on the technical, operational and company management as well
as on the regulatory bodies and the governmental level. On technical and operational
management level, design flaws of the DG’s equipment, poor familiarity with the
available equipment and procedures as well as insufficient training of the crew
coupled with limited risk awareness have been identified as the reasons for the errors
at the sharp end. The crew is responsible for the operation and proper maintenance
of the equipment onboard and for that reason is mandatory to have the right
qualification to do so supplemented with the required supervision and support from
the company. Apart from that, the insufficient training and the limited risk awareness
were factors with significant contribution to the accident. It is Master’s responsibility
to ensure that the crew is adequately familiar with the emergency procedures, the
equipment and be sufficiently trained for emergencies. In addition to that, it is also the
company's responsibility to verify the crew’s competence to deal with hazards
onboard the ship, with a well-established system that will monitor the implementation
of the mandatory procedures.
On the company management level, it has been identified poor decision
making and risk management regarding the actions of the company to rectify a known
problem which had led to the deterioration of the equipment and the fire in the E/R.
Furthermore, organizational and budgeting factors had also contributed to that. Poor
risk assessment was also identified in the firefighting systems since the activation
delay parameter for the Hi-Fog system was a significant contributing factor for the
development of the accident. Despite the over-voluminous SMS the company had,

46

the procedures described in the SOPF manual were not part of the SMS which is a
company's management negligence. The poor quality and assessment of the drills
and training program combined with the inadequate supervision of the crew’s
performance at the drills were factors that have influenced the flawed actions of the
crew during the firefighting efforts. The flaws at the CO2 system are related to
company management and further up in the hierarchy. The system’s deficiencies
could have been detected on the delivery of the vessel if the company had established
an adequate inspection program in order to ensure that the CO2 system is operational
and the procedures are in compliance with the IMO standards.
On the regulatory bodies and associations level, the analysis revealed
contributing factors to the accident, deriving from the RO and the inspection of the
USCG. When the PSC conducts an inspection, it is necessary to verify that the safety
standards are maintained and the provisions of the international regulations are fully
implemented onboard the ships. During the annual examination conducted by the
USCG, the lack of training should have been identified prior to the departure of the
vessel. Although the actions of the PSCOs did not directly affect the flow of events,
the analysis indicates that the existing guidelines for the evaluation of drills have to
be revised. On the other hand, the actions of the RO had a direct impact on the
activation failure of the CO2 system. The RO did not detect at the final inspection of
the vessel on the delivery, the numerous deficiencies related to the installed
equipment. The analysis evidenced administrational oversights and inadequate
inspection standards by the RO. Furthermore, the approval of incorrect activation
instructions for the CO2 system apart from the devastating consequences it had, was
also in contrast with the provisions of the Code for Fire Safety Systems. The above
evidence indicates the connection of the FS to the actions of the RO.
On the Government policy and legislation level, the analysis indicated
oversight flaws for the RO by the FS. As the RO acts on behalf of the FS, the latter
have to implement the adequate oversight on the RO and its actions. The postcasualty inspection revealed that the problems with the CO2 system should have been
detected by the initial or a subsequent inspection. It can be concluded that the FS
should continuously monitor the ROs acting on its behalf to ensure that the vessels
flying its flag are safe and seaworthy.
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The extracted results from the HFACS-MA analysis, revealed organizational
influences and lack of supervision related to the unsafe acts at the sharp coupled with
flaws found on the safety equipment. The WBG provided an overview of the causal
factors and their connections. Considering the SCM principle, the removal of holes
from the cheese is interpreted as the removal of the connection link among the factors
not allowing the accident to occur. It is argued that the human error is main causal
factor to accidents, something that has been verified also in the case of CARNIVAL
SPLENDOR but the most important finding of the analysis is that the external, the
organizational influences and the unsafe supervision combined, accounts for the
40,7% of the contributing factors. Such a high percentage verifies the need for the
accident investigations to look deeper for organizational influencing causes that are
difficult to identify and may be neglected. Moreover, the use of HFACS-MA revealed
factors at the top of the hierarchy related with gaps of administrational oversight.
Summing up, the use of AcciMap and HFACS-MA have identified similar
causal factors for the accident of CARNIVAL SPLENDOR. Beyond the human factors,
the most valuable result generated from both models was the connection of the FS
and the RO’s actions that have significantly contributed to the accident. The reasons
for the issues the CO2 system had was lying at the top level of the hierarchy, reflecting
the quality of the established policies regarding maritime safety at the governmental
level. Every FS has the responsibility to establish the appropriate measures to ensure
the effective implementation of the IMO instruments to which they are a party (IMO,
2001). In resolution A.912(22), it is stated that every FS should take measures to
ensure the safety at sea regarding the construction, equipment and management of
ships, as well as the training of crews (IMO, 2001). These are few of the areas that
have to be covered by the legal framework of the FS and relevant to the case of the
CARNIVAL SPLENDOR since flaws and gaps have been identified in each of these
areas. The delegation of the statutory responsibilities to ROs does not mean that the
work of the FS is completed, in fact it continues with the implementation of a rigorous
oversight to the organizations acting on its behalf. Furthermore, every RO has to be
scrutinized and verified that complies with the specifications on conducting statutory
surveys and certification (IMO, 1995).
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A FS in order to have hi-performance is mandatory to adopt the necessary
policies on how to implement the international regulations and define clear strategies
for the MA on how to monitor the capacity of the ROs. A FS with poor oversight over
the ROs will result in low FSP which might increase the possibilities for accidents on
the fleet. The case of CARNIVAL SPLENDOR identified the FS’s oversight gap as
contributing factor for the accident and it can be identified as a factor of low FSP and
possibly incorporated in the 5th layer of HFACS. Chen et al., (2013) with HFACS-MA
incorporated 3 categories of factors, with the administrational oversight generally
addressing a wide range of involved factors. It is the author's belief that the
incorporation of the FS performance into the HFACS is needed to properly address
the FS’s oversight gaps.
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6.

Conclusion
Many marine investigations have shown that an accident is not a product of a

single error. The occurrence of an accident requires the conjunction of several errors
committed either at the sharp end or at the decision-making level of the organization;
and as this study showed could be even higher. The human element is undoubtedly
a crucial factor related to marine accidents and the HOFs still require further research
to fully understand. The accident investigation is a key element to identify and analyze
casualty factors. Furthermore, it creates the framework for the development of new
safety regulations that will prevent accidents. Many accident investigation models are
focusing on the identification of human errors as the causal factors without searching
deeper.
Shipping is considered as a heavily regulated industry with significant increase
of the applied regulations in the last decades. The fundamental basis for those
regulations to work is the establishment of a harmonized national regulatory
framework that has to be based on the obligations of the international maritime
conventions (Kristiansen, 2008). UNCLOS has set the fundamental provisions for the
investigation of casualties but it is related to accidents occurred on the high seas. It is
also an obligation for the FS to conduct casualty investigations on the ships flying its
flag; however, the establishment of a safe shipping is on the will of each government.
The adopted policies combined the available national legislation are crucial for the
quality of accident investigations and directly connected to the FSP. Policy and
legislation gaps found on the governmental level will have significant impact on the
causation of marine accidents since the organizational and human factors lying below
the top level are directly affected. The regulatory framework available is setting the
obligations but the development of methods to further analyze accidents at sea is
needed for the identification of the underlying gaps in the top level of hierarchy.
The case of the CARNIVAL SPLENDOR which was analyzed with AcciMap
and HFACS-MA demonstrated how a poorly implemented oversight to the RO by the
FS, contributed to the accident. Moreover, it indicates that every casualty investigation
has to look beyond the human errors and identify underlying causal factors in the
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company management, administration and even at government level. The FS has the
obligation to ensure the safety at sea on the ships entitled to fly its flag through the
adopted policies and strategies regarding maritime safety. Since the statutory work of
the FS is conducted by the delegation of authority to the ROs, a well-structured
overseeing system is mandatory for the FS to ensure the provisions of international
maritime conventions are well implemented onboard the fleet. The incorporation of
the FS performance into the HFACS taxonomy has a binary scope. The first is to
contribute to the marine casualty investigations since the category of low FSP will
identify factors related with the oversight of the ROs and reveal gaps on the adopted
policies of the FS. Second to assist FSs and their MAs to improve and further develop
their adopted policies and strategies regarding the monitoring of the ROs.
This thesis investigated a single accident and looked deep for causal factors
lying at the top levels of the hierarchy as well as for their connection on every level. It
is suggested that further research is needed for the adoption of the FS performance
into the HFACS. Research that will investigate a bigger sample of accidents combined
with the evaluation of national adopted maritime policies is considered to be extremely
beneficial for the maritime community and accident prevention.
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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Vessel Particulars (USCG, 2013)
Category
Owner
Flag
Hull Number
Call Sign
Classification Society
Lloyd’s Register Number
IMO Number
Gross Registered Tonnage
Net Registered Tonnage
Deadweight Tonnage
Number of Decks
Total Lifesaving Capacity
Maximum Guests
Maximum Crew
Length Overall
Length P-P (Perpendiculars)
Beam at Waterline
Beam at Bridge Wings

Details
Carnival Corporation
Panama
6135
3EUS
Lloyd’s Register
9333163
IMO 9333163
113,300
85,850
99.5
17
4,914
3,734
1,180
290.2 meters
247.7 meters
35.5 meters
41.6 meters

NOTE: The Information of the Appendix 1 are cited exactly as in the USCG
investigation report.

Appendix 2 – Vessel’s Machinery Data (USCG, 2013)
Machinery Equipment
Diesel Engines
Total Installed Power
Generators
Emergency Generators
Propulsion Motors
Automation System
Switchboard
Fire/Smoke Detection System
CO2 Extinguishing System
Water Mist/Sprinkler System

Specifications
6 x 12 cylinder, Wartsila 46C 1050 kW/cylinder
75.6 MW
6 x 14,000 Kva 3 Phase AC; 60 Hz; 11,000 volt
1500 kW Isotta Fraschini-Marelli
2 X 21 MW 146 rpm; 2830 volts, reversible
Valmarine, APSS Damatic XD
M.V. Imesa L.V. Schneider
Autronica – Norway
Wormald
Marioff Hi-Fog® Fire Protection System Marioff-Finland

NOTE: The Information of the Appendix 1 are cited exactly as in the USCG
investigation report.
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Appendix 3 – CARNIVAL SPLENDOR – Timeline of the Accident (USCG, 2013)
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Appendix 3 – CARNIVAL SPLENDOR – Timeline of the Accident (continue)
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Appendix 3 – CARNIVAL SPLENDOR – Timeline of the Accident (continue)
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Appendix 3 – CARNIVAL SPLENDOR – Timeline of the Accident (continue)

62

Appendix 3 – CARNIVAL SPLENDOR – Timeline of the Accident (continue)
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